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Abstract 
The question of what kind of civic virtues citizens of the United States need in order to 
maintain the republic and to enable it to flourish, is one that was on the minds of the 
Framers themselves.  They recognized that good government would depend upon the 
moral character and intellectual abilities of the citizens, on their having certain qualities 
of heart and mind.  While institutional arrangements were employed to minimize reliance 
upon such character and abilities as much as possible, the Framers did not understand 
themselves to be eliminating those qualities, as an examination of The Federalist shows.  
Further, the institutional arrangements themselves were expected to contribute to the 
fostering of certain civic virtues.  Yet it is not the case that such formal, structural 
provisions were expected to be sufficient on their own to engender good citizens.  Rather, 
the Framers left the bulk of the responsibility of forming character to the states instead of 
the national government, where it was already being undertaken.  Public education, in 
particular, is one means by which the states at the time of the Founding were seeking to 








Morehead State University 
Institute for Regional Analysis and Public Policy 
Combs 110 I 
Morehead, KY  40351 
















  1  Despite the major transformations of American government since the Founding 
(steady democratization, establishment of the welfare state, concentration of policy 
making in the federal government, administrative centralization in the federal bureacracy, 
expansion of rights, etc.), the foundation for our system of government laid by the 
Framers remains largely intact.  The Constitution still gives shape and sets the limits to 
the possibilities imposed upon it.   
  Read with a view to civic virtue, the Constitution of the United States appears 
devoid of any explicit attention to the character of citizens.  The only exceptions may be 
the oaths of office, the amendments prohibiting race and sex as eligibility criteria for 
voting, and the prohibition amendments.  Even in these cases, however, the character of 
citizens is not explicitly mentioned.  The lack of explicit constitutional provisions that 
recognize a need for civic virtue and attempt to foster it directly, though, is not decisive, 
as this paper will show.  The Framers, who drafted the Constitution of the United States 
and were its strongest supporters, recognized a need for civic virtue in Americans if the 
new government was not only to function but was to be what they strived for—good 
government.  They argued that numerous constitutional provisions actually do have an 
effect on character, and were designed to do so.  Such arguments are made in The 
Federalist, to which we may turn to gain a fuller closer examination of the character of 
citizens and the special virtues required of them.  This paper will suggest, however, that 
such provisions are only the final punctuation to the Framers’ concern for the cultivation 
of civic virtue. 
When one turns to The Federalist with the question of fostering civic virtue in 
mind, what is striking is the explicitly negative depiction of human nature by Publius 
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beings emphasized most frequently in The Federalist are passion, ambition, and self-
interestedness (especially economic self-interest such as avarice, greed, love of wealth).  
Furthermore, there is mention of the “infirmities and depravities of the human character” 
(No. 37, 185), the “depravity of mankind which requires a certain degree of 
circumspection and distrust” (No. 55, 291), the “universal venality of human nature” (No. 
76, 395), and “the folly and wickedness of mankind” (No. 78, 407).  As Madison says in 
The Federalist No. 51 (269), “But what is government itself, but the greatest of all 
reflections on human nature?  If men were angels, no government would be necessary”; 
and in No. 55 (288), “In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, 
passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a 
Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”  So not only are human 
beings depraved and wicked by nature, our passions, ambitions, and interests routinely 
overrule our reason.  This is a severe indictment of human nature, and it is the view upon 
which American government is founded.  So given that representative democracy entails 
a heavy reliance upon the people for good government, a reliance surpassed only by pure 
democracy, it would seem that everything that can be done to encourage moderation, 
justice, public spiritedness, and prudence should be done.   
This was the view of classical republicanism.  Classical republicans in the 
American context sought to bring about a kind of “Christian Sparta” (Horwitz 1986, 
137).  It would be composed of citizens with sturdy yeoman virtues such as frugality, 
industry, temperance, and simplicity, as well as martial virtues such as scorn of ease, 
contempt of danger, and love of valor.  It was understood that these virtues would require 
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“neither the wisest constitution nor the wisest laws will secure liberty and happiness of a 
people whose manners are universally corrupt” (Horwitz 1986, 138).  This concern with 
the cultivation of civic virtues to correct for the defects of human nature was more the 
explicit concern of the Anti-Federalists than the Federalists.  Their view did not prevail, 
though, so let us leave them aside for present purposes. 
Rather than reshaping the character of citizens, the Federalists appear to have 
relied on constructing intricate institutional arrangements to correct for the worst effects 
of bad character, thereby limiting the opportunities for passion, ambition, and self-interest 
to undermine the common good.   The separation of the three basic kinds of political 
power into three branches of government: the power to make the law, the power to 
execute the law, and the power to adjudicate violations of the law, is one example of this 
kind of institutional arrangement.  These powers are, of course, not simply separated 
from one another, but each branch is given some degree of overlapping authority with the 
others, such that it can protect its own integrity and restrain any excesses of the other 
branches that are detrimental to the people’s interests.  Yet this was not thought to be 
sufficient to control passion, ambition, and self-interest.  The legislative branch, deemed 
to be the most dangerous, is itself divided into two, and each chamber of Congress is 
granted both overlapping and exclusive powers that would hold in check the excesses of 
the other.  Governmental power was further divided between different levels of 
government: federal and state first of all, but in practice, county, city, and local 
governments as well.  This fragmentation of power both across government and down 
through the levels of government makes it difficult to get things done.  This was 
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and the pursuit of happiness.  The greatest threat to these comes from government itself.  
Government must be restrained so far as to make it difficult to accomplish more than is 
strictly necessary, such that it cannot become overbearing.  Perhaps through the right 
institutional arrangements, then, classical republicanism’s attempt to reform human 
nature and instill civic virtue could be dispensed with.  A closer look at The Federalist, 
however, shows that this is not the case. 
In Federalist No. 1 (1), Hamilton notes that it has been  
reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the 
important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of 
establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are 
forever destined for their political constitutions on accident and force. … Happy 
will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true 
interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the 
public good. 
  
Hamilton goes on to speak of the obstacles, though, to this public-spirited deliberation 
over the merits of the proposed constitution, especially the all-too-common “passions and 
prejudices little favorable to the discovery of the truth” (No. 1, 1).  Most inimical to 
sound judgment and public-spiritedness, however, are the private interests of powerful, 
ambitious, and influential men on the one hand, and “the honest errors of minds led 
astray by preconceived jealousies and fears” on the other (No. 1, 2):   
So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false 
bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on 
the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to 
society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would always furnish a lesson of 
moderation, to those who are engaged in any controversy….  Ambition, avarice, 
personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable 
than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose 
the right side of a question. 
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to require moderation, calm deliberation, sound prudential judgment, and a devotion to 
the public good, not only among those who design the government, but among all those 
who must reflect on that design and decide whether to choose it as the fundamental law 
by which they will be governed.  Such civic virtues as moderation, prudence, and justice 
are required throughout the citizenry at this crucial founding moment, and in Federalist 
No. 1, Hamilton is concerned about whether such qualities will prevail in the decision at 
hand. 
  He is not optimistic, in fact, about the likelihood of an impartial rational 
assessment on the merits of the document alone.  “Happy will it be if our choice should 
be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, uninfluenced by considerations 
foreign to the public good.  But this is more ardently to be wished for, than seriously to 
be expected” (No. 1, 1).  There are too many interests, passions, and prejudices 
surrounding these matters to expect that “the discovery of the truth” will prevail in all.  
Regarding people in general, “in the contemplation of a sound and well informed 
judgment, their interests can never be separated” (No. 1, 3).  Yet there is little choice but 
to strive for rational and impartial judgment.   
The Federalist as a whole is an attempt to address this concern.  While the 
proposed constitution itself contains many mechanisms to minimize reliance upon civic 
virtue for ongoing good government, the ratification process contained no built-in 
mechanisms to guarantee calm deliberation, a devotion to the broad public good, and 
sound prudential judgment. Reflecting on this predicament in Federalist No. 1 (3), 
Hamilton admits to having “an eye to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, 
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your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of 
truth.”  It is clear that throughout The Federalist Publius has the other eye set upon 
explaining both the system of government in the proposed constitution and why it serves 
the public interest, while also providing an example of the kind of calm deliberation, 
devotion to the public good, and prudence that the people themselves should emulate.  
The Federalist is designed to moderate the passions of the people, educate them about the 
choice before them, and encourage deliberation, public spiritedness, and prudence.  If the 
American regime is not to be founded by “accident or force,” such qualities needed to be 
encouraged in the citizenry so as to establish “good government from reflection and 
choice.”   
So The Federalist attempts to do once, at the founding of the nation, what its 
authors argue cannot be done routinely, educate the voting public on the merits of the 
issue, moderate their passions with reasoned argument, and appeal to their public 
spiritedness to make a prudent judgment that serves the common interest.  It is hoped that 
“reason, justice, and truth” will prevail in their “authority over the public mind” at least 
this once (No. 63, 327).  That is, the nation has a democratic moment at its birth, as the 
social contract theory of Hobbes and Locke describe, that establishes a representative 
form of government—a republic, not a pure democracy. 
Now it may be that the virtue required in founding a regime may be significantly 
different from the virtue required to maintain it, as Machiavelli observed.  So once well-
established, individual character and ability might be less important.  Yet state 
constitutions at the time frequently referred to the need to return regularly to 
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republican government.  If so, then there may be a perpetual need for the virtue required 
in founding a regime.  The American system of government seems to ignore this need 
and instead attempts to control the effects of passions and interests rather than to instill 
civic virtue or to rely on “enlightened statesmen” (No. 10, 45) or on “the philosophical 
race of kings wished for by Plato” (No 49, 262).  Even so, in every branch of government 
the Framers acknowledged that a degree of civic virtue played a role and it was expected 
that people with such virtues would fill the offices of the new government often, if not 
always. 
Most generally, republicanism relies in the first place on carefully chosen 
representatives to enact good public policy. In fact, Madison notes in The Federalist No. 
10 (42) that the more democratic forms of government in the states were already 
recognized to be problematic. 
Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous 
citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal 
liberty, that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded 
in the conflict of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not 
according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the 
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. 
 
Madison goes on to argue that such factions as these cannot be cured (except for a cure 
that is worse than the disease) and that the best that can be done is to alleviate the effects 
of faction. He shows how republics are especially well suited to this in comparison to 
democracies.  In distinguishing pure democracies from republics, Madison emphasizes 
“two great points of difference…first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a 
small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and 
the greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.”   The first crucial 
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views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom 
may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of 
justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations” (No. 10, 
46-7).  It is clear, then, that the success of republican government in alleviating the 
effects of factions requires the election of individuals who are comparatively wise, 
patriotic, just, farsighted, and public spirited.  These are more than qualities that would be 
admirable adornments for public figures; these qualities are clearly deemed to be 
instrumental to the creation of good public policy.  While there is no guarantee that such 
people will always be elected, just as Madison notes earlier that “enlightened statesmen 
will not always be at the helm” (No. 10, 45), he does argue that the constitution makes it 
more likely that they will be elected:  “Does this advantage consist in the substitution of 
representatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to 
local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice?  It will not be denied, that the 
representation of the union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments” 
(No 10, 48).  There must always be more of these virtuous elected representatives than 
those “of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs” in our legislative 
branch. 
So while the Constitution as a whole attempts to supply “the defect of better 
motives” (No. 51, 269), the Framers did not pretend to supply the defect wholly by 
institutional arrangements.  In these provisions for the House of Representatives, it was 
certainly hoped that men of moderation, justice, and prudence would become lawmakers.  
The Framers themselves recognized the need for those “who possess the most attractive 
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government as often as possible.   
This provision for a House of Representatives being insufficient, however, to 
prevent either “schemes of usurpation and perfidy…ambition or corruption” or to prevent 
yielding “to the impulse of sudden and violent passions” of the people, the Senate was 
created.  Since “a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it,” 
the qualifications of Senators are different.  This is “explained by the nature of the 
senatorial trust; which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, 
requires, at the same time, that the senator should have reached a period of life most 
likely to supply these advantages…” (No. 62, 319).  And with regard to the longer 
duration of the senatorial term, Madison notes that “good government implies two things: 
first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, 
a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained.”  It is with regard to 
knowledge in particular that Madison observes that “in the American governments, too 
little attention has been paid…” (No. 62, 322).  That is, elections in the states are so 
frequent and the turnover so high, that there is not time to acquire the knowledge and 
expertise necessary to craft good legislation, such that it does not need to be continually 
explained, amended, or repealed.
1  The Senate corrects for this with longer terms, which 
allows senators to gather information, gain experience, and develop expertise—
prerequisites for the development of prudence.  So the advantages of “stability of 
character” are to be combined with the longer term in office so as to cultivate 
                                                 
1 Madison points out that “the most deplorable effect” of frequent changes in the 
laws “is that diminution of attachment and reverence, which steals into the hearts of the 
people” (No. 62, 324).  Thus it undermines both patriotism and law-abidingness, two 
basic qualities sought for in any decent citizenry. 
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combines certain civic virtues with institutional arrangements so as to promote good 
government.  What of the other two branches of government? 
With regard to election of a president and vice-president, Hamilton (No. 68, 354) 
observes, “The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President 
will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the 
requisite qualification. … It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant 
probability of seeing the station filled by characters preëmeinent for ability and virtue.”  
For similar reasons, the vice-president, too, is expected to be “an extraordinary person” 
(N. 68, 354).  While the Electoral College is designed to identify and elect such persons, 
it does not create them.  They must exist already, of course, if they are to fill these 
offices. 
Finally, with regard to members of the federal judiciary, Hamilton (No. 78, 407) 
notes on the one hand “the folly and wickedness of mankind” that produce so many 
judicial proceedings and consequently so many precedents that judges must engage in 
“long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them.  Hence, it is that 
there can be but few men in the society, who will have sufficient skill in the laws to 
qualify them for the stations of judges.  And making the proper deductions for the 
ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite 
the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge.”  So knowledge of the law must be 
combined with personal integrity.  The institutional arrangements, including tenure 
during good behavior, do not create such integrity from nothing; rather, they allow such 
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being improperly influenced by the other branches of government.   
So individuals with certain civic virtues are required for the American republic to 
function well, resulting in good government.  There is no question that institutional 
arrangements are relied upon so as to reduce reliance upon the lack of virtuous character 
in elected officials and in the people themselves.  To reduce such reliance, however, is 
not to eliminate it.  As has just been shown, the authors of The Federalist did not 
understand themselves to be constructing a government that through its clever 
institutional arrangements could dispense with all concern for civic virtue.  
To repeat, though, individuals with civic virtue must exist already in order to be 
elected or appointed.  Where do these people come from?  How do people come to have 
moderation, prudence, justice, and public spiritedness?  Are people taught these things?  
Are they born with them?  Are they acquired through habituation?  Or do they have some 
more mysterious source?
2  The Federalist, of course, does not say.  This is among its 
most puzzling features—a thoughtful discussion of human nature and its consequences 
for government, a recognition that good character remains essential for the American 
republic, but no discussion of how that character comes into being.   
There appear to be three prevailing positions about the Framers’ views on where 
the required civic virtue would come from.  The first view is that they essentially 
neglected the issue altogether.  Others (Gordon Wood, for example), argue that they 
                                                 
2 These are questions that are central in classical political philosophy, for 
example, in  Plato’s Meno.  Such questions are of fundamental, universal, and permanent 
importance. Identifying these fundamental questions—both why they are of fundamental 
importance and why they are questions—is not trivial.  It may be the first—and central—
task of political philosophy. 
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and institutions that would insure ‘the existence and security of the government, even in 
the absence of political virtue’” (Horwitz 1986, 139).  The evidence that I have just 
presented shows that this is not entirely correct.  As noted above, the institutional 
arrangements are of crucial importance in reducing reliance upon “enlightened 
statesmen” but it does not eliminate the need for statesmanlike qualities altogether. 
The second position is that the institutional arrangements themselves not only 
limit vices but also promote certain virtues.  Robert Goldwin (1986, 33), for example, 
argues that “the Framers did not seek to remake Americans, but rather to take them as 
they are and lead them to habits of right action.”  This is done by putting “separate parts 
of political power in the hands of different officials in different parts of the 
government…and encourage, if they need encouragement, ambition and self-interest.”  
Goldwin contends that over time the end result is that such separation of power and 
intentional institutional conflict “trains us in habits of restraint and moderation….”  
Martin Diamond (1986) elaborates this position more fully.  He analyzes Madison’s 
treatment of the problem of faction in Federalist No. 10.  Factions are based primarily on 
three different sources: opinions (especially religious and political), passions, and 
interests (i.e., economic interests).  Since the problem of factions cannot be cured 
altogether, and since the most dangers factions are those based on opinions and passions, 
Madison selects economic interests as relatively tranquil and seeks to magnify them.   
This “will divide people according to the narrow and particularized economic interests 
and keep them from forming factions around opinion or passion”. Hence the need for a 
“large modern commercial society” in order to create these “various and interfering 
  13interests” (90-93).  According to Diamond (1986, 95), “in order to defuse the dangerous 
factional force of opinion, passion, and class interest, Madison’s policy deliberately risks 
magnifying and multiplying in American life the selfish, the interested, the narrow, the 
vulgar, and the crassly economic.”  Over time, however, Madison’s strategy has an effect 
on the character of citizens.  It fosters certain kinds of virtue, such as bourgeois virtues 
(e.g., a degree of moderation and self-restraint, venturesomeness, hard work, and 
honesty) and republican virtues (e.g., independence, initiative, a capacity for cooperation, 
and patriotism).  This also at least allows for higher human virtue to develop (e.g., the 
pursuit of knowledge through the intellectual life), even if it does not actively foster it 
(Diamond 1986, 99-104). 
Goldwin’s and Diamond’s position is sensible and their explanation compelling.  
However, laws themselves do not make citizens virtuous.  If the institutional 
arrangements are followed routinely and if acquisitiveness is effectively encouraged by 
the laws, they will surely have an effect on character, but voluntary obedience to the laws 
requires a least a degree of self-restraint and an appreciation of the goodness of justice; 
these are prerequisites, not only consequences.  So this is not a completely sufficient 
account.  Nor does it yet account for how the integrity, preeminent character, wisdom, 
and love of justice come about, which representatives, senators, presidents, and judges 
are to have.   
The third view is that the Framers not only recognized a need for civic virtue, and 
expected institutional arrangements to contribute to a certain kind of civic character, but 
that they also recognized the need to foster this more directly.  Colleen A. Sheehan 
(1992), for example, argues that Madison is neither a classical republican who simply 
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government, nor is he the kind of liberal democrat that relies solely upon institutional 
arrangements for good government.  Rather, “while the Madisonian science of politics 
utilizes means different from the classical science, it is nonetheless directed to the 
classical republican task of improving the opinions and souls of citizens and developing 
among them a republican character” (611).  This is shown primarily in his “Notes on 
Government,” wherein “Madison demonstrates that education in virtue is of the utmost 
republican concern” (623).   
Sheehan’s suggestions are based on her examination of works by Madison outside 
of The Federalist.  This is sensible, for while, as James W. Ceaser (1990, 15-16) 
suggests, The Federalist does point toward a “positive idea of citizenship as necessary for 
liberal democracy” he reminds us,  
There is a reason why The Federalist does not treat this question fully.  The 
Federalist’s intention…was not to provide a comprehensive theoretical account of 
liberal democracy, but to establish the case for a national government in the 
United States.  Given this objective, The Federalist was not obliged to treat every 
major question about liberal democracy, and it was especially likely to avoid 
certain matters that were to be dealt with chiefly by the states or local 
governments.  The means of promoting citizenship fall mainly in this area, and 
they clearly involve a use of powers that opponents of the Constitution were least 
disposed to grant to the national government. 
  A great error in interpreting The Federalist has been to treat it as if it were 
meant to provide a comprehensive view of the respective roles of public and 
private spheres in a liberal democracy.  To be comprehensive, it would have had 
to discuss the role of state and local governments, which it does not.  This error of 
interpretation is compounded when some attempt to equate The Federalist’s view 
about the role of the national government with the role of government in general.  
An interpretation of this kind inevitably distorts the views of the authors of The 
Federalist about the nature of liberal democracy and how it might be maintained, 
especially in regard to the question of how to secure liberal democratic 
citizenship. 
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of liberal democracy and of the American republic, Alexis de Tocqueville.  In the interest 
of simply clarifying how republican government in America was designed to work by 
those who created it, though, I propose examining Ceaser’s tacit suggestion that the 
Framers regarded the fostering of liberal democratic civic virtue to be a responsibility 
undertaken at the state level. 
  My hypothesis is that the cultivation of civic virtue in citizens was thought by the 
Federalists to be a state issue, not a national one.  It was already being undertaken in the 
states in the form of a budding public education, and the Framers assumed that this would 
continue—and would need to continue—for American government to function well.  
Preliminary evidence to establish the plausibility of this hypothesis can be found in 
Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia (1954, 148).  In speaking of his plan 
for educating “the youths of genius from among the classes of the poor” he remarks that 
the people … are the ultimate guardians of their own liberty.  … In every 
government on earth is some trace of human weakness, some germ of corruption 
and degeneracy, which cunning will discover, and wickedness insensibly open, 
cultivate, and improve.  Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers 
of the people alone.  The people themselves therefore are the only safe 




Jefferson sought to improve their minds through public education.  To be guardians of 
their own liberty citizens would need to know how to read in order to be well informed, 
how to write in order to express their opinions to others, how to speak in order to 
persuade their fellows, and some basic mathematics in order to understand the finances of 
                                                 
3 A fuller account of the educational ideas of the Founders is presented in Lorraine 
Smith Pangle and Thomas L. Pangle’s The Learning of Liberty (Kansas: The University 
of Kansas Press, 1993). 
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foundation of public education.  Further, these are all intellectual abilities, which reminds 
us that civic virtue is more than the formation of character (e.g., the self-restraint, 
integrity, and public spiritedness alluded to above).  It must include the cultivation of the 
rational part of the soul as well. 
A cursory overview of the history of public education in the United States reveals 
that it has always been charged with fostering both of these aspects of civic virtue in 
future citizens.  Indeed, at the very “creation of the United States, following the 
American Revolution, every new state asserted in its constitution that public schools were 
essential to the republic” (Fuhrman and Lazerson 2005, xxiv).  To investigate my 
hypothesis further, then, the first step will be to examine the thirteen pre-existing state 
constitutions, together with state education policies at the time that the Constitution of the 
United States was being written and ratified, to determine what provisions were already 
in place in the states to cultivate citizens fitted for the American republic.  This 
examination will be supplemented by a review of the educational ideals of the founding 
generation, of those who recognized the need for the cultivation of civic virtue through 
public education and who were influential through their writings, such as Benjamin 
Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson.  The views of the founding generation on 
these matters must then be compared to liberal democratic theory on the moral and 
intellectual qualities required in citizens.  This entails asking, what are the essential 
characteristics of this liberal democracy? At what does the regime aim?  What, if 
anything, does it require of its citizens in order not merely to be maintained but to 
function well?  Only after answering such questions would we be able to determine, for 
  17example, whether the cultivation of minimally good citizens through public education 
ought to be primarily character education, civic education, or liberal education.  This 
requires an examination of the original liberal political theorists such as Hobbes, Spinoza, 
Locke, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville.  Finally, it will be necessary to consider what we 
are doing today to foster the civic virtue we need in our citizens.  For example, does 
public education accomplish this goal?  Is it a goal that is best accomplished through 
local, state, or federal policy making?  How has the centralization of educational policy 
making at the federal level affected this role of public education?  Having established that 
the Framers acknowledged the need for civic virtue in order for American government to 
function well, a systematic examination of these questions will help to provide the proper 
framework for evaluating current educational policy at each level of government in light 
of this objective. 
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